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An energy-time entanglement-based dispersive optics quantum key distribution (DO-QKD) is demonstrated experimen-
tally over optical fibers of 20 km. In the experiment, the telecom band energy-time entangled photon pairs are generated
through spontaneous four wave mixing in a silicon waveguide. The arrival time of photons are registered for key gen-
erating and security test. High dimensional encoding in the arrival time of photons is used to increase the information
per coincidence of photon pairs. The bin sifting process is optimized by a three level structure, which significantly
reduces the raw quantum bit error rate (QBER) due to timing jitters of detectors and electronics. A raw key generation
rate of 151kbps with QBER of 4.95% is achieved, under a time-bin encoding format with 4 bits per coincidence. This
experiment shows that entanglement-based DO-QKD can be implemented in an efficient and convenient way, which
has great potential in quantum secure communication networks in the future.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits remote parties to
share secret keys. The secret keys can be further used for
symmetric encryption, such as the one-time pad encryption
scheme, which provides information-theoretic secure mes-
sage transmission. Since the first protocol (BB84)1 was pro-
posed, QKD has been developed significantly2–5. From the
point of QKD implementation, there are mainly two kinds
of QKD schemes, which are the prepare-and-measurement
(P&M) schemes6,7 and the entanglement-based schemes8,9.
The entanglement-based QKD has inherent random local re-
sults and correlated outcomes. No extra random number gen-
erators are required in these schemes. On the other hand, if
it could be swapped with high fidelity by quantum repeater
nodes, photonic entanglement could be extended over long
distances, which is promising to realize global scale quantum
networks10. Hence, the entanglement-based QKD are impor-
tant as a basic function of future quantum secure communica-
tion networks.
Dispersive optics QKD (DO-QKD) is a promising QKD
protocol11 developed in recent years, which is robust in sys-
tem stability and convenient in implementation. In DO-QKD,
normal and anomalous dispersion components are introduced
at Alice and Bob sides, constructing the time-frequency bases.
The security test of DO-QKD can be realized by measure-
ments of unbiased time-frequency bases, which has been
proven to be secure against collective attacks11. The P&M
protocols of DO-QKD has been demonstrated by field exper-
iments with a high key rate of 1.2 Mbps over optical fibers
of 43km12. However, the entanglement-based DO-QKD was
only demonstrated by short fiber links with relatively low key
generation rates13. In this work, we experimentally realized
a)Electronic mail: zwei@tsinghua.edu.cn
the entanglement-based DO-QKD over single mode optical
fibers of 20 km. Energy-time entangled photon pairs were
used in this experiment, which were generated by spontaneous
four wave mixing (SFWM) in piece of silicon waveguide. In
order to enhance the key generation rate, high dimensional
encoding was used to increase the information per coinci-
dence of photon pairs. On the other hand, the bin sifting
process was optimized by a three level structure, which sig-
nificantly reduced the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of raw
keys due to timing jitters of detectors and electronics. This
experiment shows an efficient and convenient way to realize
entanglement-based DO-QKD.
The experimental setup of energy-time entanglement-based
DO-QKD is shown schematically in Fig. 1. At Alice side,
energy-time entangled photon pairs are generated through
SFWM in a piece of silicon waveguide under CW pumping.
The length of the waveguide is 5 mm and the wavelength
of the pump light is 1549.32 nm. Then the signal and idler
photons of each photon pairs are selected out by a filter sys-
tem made of cascaded dense wavelength division multiplexer
(DWDM). The central wavelengths of the generated signal
and idle photons were 1546.12nm and 1552.52nm, respec-
tively. Signal photons are used for Alice’s local measurement.
The idler photons are sent to Bob through single mode fibers
of 20 km. A dispersion compensation module (DCM) are in-
troduced to compensate the dispersion introduced by the opti-
cal fibers. At each side, a 50:50 fiber coupler routes photons
into two paths randomly. In one path, photons are detected
directly, which corresponds to the time basis, and the time of
single photon detection events are recorded, which are mainly
used for the key generation. In the other path, photons are
detected and recorded after a normal dispersion (ND, at Al-
ice side) or abnormal dispersion (AD, at Bob side) module
(± 1800 ps/nm), which corresponds to the frequency basis
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2FIG. 1. The setup of entanglement-based DO-QKD. EDFA: Erbium doped fiber amplifier; VOA: variable optical attenuator; FPC: fiber po-
larization controller; DWDM: dense wavelength division multiplexing filter; DCM: dispersion compensation module; ND: normal dispersion;
AD: anomalous dispersion; TCSPC: time-correlated single-photon counting module.
and is used for security test. In the experiments, four NbN
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs,
fabricated by SIMIT, CAS, China) are used, with detection ef-
ficiency of 50% at 1550 nm. Their dark-count rates are about
100 counts per second, average timing jitters are 80ps. Single
photon events are precisely recorded by a time-to-digital con-
verter (TCSPC, PicoQuant HydraHarp 400) under a resolution
of 1 ps and then sent to a computer for data processing.
At Alice and Bob sides, photons are detected by either the
time basis or frequency basis, and their time resolved coin-
cidence are used for security test. The coincidence between
the photons of time bases at both sides show a narrow peak.
The full width at half maximum (FWHM) of the coincidence
peak is mainly determined by the timing jitters of single pho-
ton detectors. The coincidence of the photons of frequency
bases also shows a narrow peak, which is the effect of non-
local dispersion cancellation introduced by the AD and ND
components at Alice and Bob sides. On the contrary, if the
coincidence measurement is taken between the photons of dif-
ferent bases at the two sides, the coincidence peak is broad-
ened by the dispersive component at the frequency basis. By
this way, the unbiased time-frequency bases are constructed
by introducing the dispersive components. Based on the sin-
gle photon events detected under frequency bases and a part
of events detected under time bases, joint measurements of
time-frequency covariance matrix (TFCM) can be carried out.
It is used to evaluate Shannon information between Alice and
Bob, and Eve’s maximum accessible information, which is
responsible for the system security11. The secure information
that Alice and Bob could extract from per coincidence14,15 is
expressed as:
∆I = β I(A;B)−χ(A;E) (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A;B) is the Shan-
non information between Alice and Bob.The Eve’s maximum
accessible information are quantified by the Holevo infor-
mation χ(A;E).To evaluate ∆I, the security analysis of DO-
QKD follows the well-established proofs for protocols of
Gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD), which are based on the optimality of Eve’s Gaussian
collective attack for a given TFCM15–17.Eve’s actions will
disturb Alice and Bob’s initial TFCM. The excess spectral
noise factor ξw is used to quantify the disturbance towards
the TFCM, which is expressed as:
ξw =
σ2w
σ2w0
−1 (2)
where σ2w quantifies the spectral correlation between detected
photons at Alice and Bob, and σ2w0 represents the noiseless
correlation excluding excess channel noise or Eve’s intrusion.
In the practical measurement, we take the back-to-back exper-
iment configuration with negligible channel loss as the noise-
less correlation case.The corresponding correlation character-
istics between Alice and Bob are treated as the noiseless cor-
relation σ2w0 . Then, I(A;B) and χ(A;E) can be calculated by
the covariance matrix approach11,15, and ∆I can be estimated
according to Eq. (1).
FIG. 2. The format of high dimensional encoding in the experiment.
A frame has M = 2N slots and a slot has I bins. In this example,
I = 3, N = 2, M = 4.
Alice and Bob build their raw keys from correlated single
photon events acquired in the time bases. The single photon
events are sifted in a large alphabet way to increase the infor-
mation per coincidence18, under a format of high dimensional
encoding shown in Fig. 2. In the format, a time frame in-
cludes M(M = 2N) consecutive slots and a slot including I
time bins. The Bin width is denoted by τ . In the sifting pro-
cess, firstly Alice and Bob communicate their frame numbers
with one single photon detection event and keep the frames
3they both obtained one event. Then, for each kept frame, Al-
ice and Bob check their time bin numbers which indicate the
time bins they record their detection events. In Fig. 2, the two
pulses with red color indicate the correlated detection events
and the two pulses with light green color indicate the possible
errors due to the non-zero coincidence peak width, which is
mainly due to timing jitters of single photon detectors in this
experiment setup. It can be expected that the checking process
of time bin numbers can significantly reduce the QBER18. If
the time bin numbers of Alice and Bob are the same, the frame
is selected out in which the single photon detection events at
Alice and Bob are considered as a coincidence event. Even-
tually, the raw keys are generated by the slot numbers of the
coincidence events in the selected frames at Alice and Bob.
Therefore, in this format one coincidence event generates raw
keys of N = log2M bits. It can be seen that Alice and Bob do
not directly communicate the information of slots and avoid
revealing the slot numbers to Eve. The parameters of this bin
sifting process should be optimized according to the system
conditions, which determines the performance of key genera-
tion. After the bin sifting processes, raw keys are generated at
Alice and Bob and then they proceed to perform error correc-
tion and privacy amplification to generate secret keys.
FIG. 3. Time resolved coincidence counts between Alice and Bob
under four possible basis combinations. (a) Coincidence counts un-
der T1 and T2; (b) Coincidence counts under T1 and F2; (c) Coinci-
dence counts under F1 and T2; (d) Coincidence counts under F1 and
F2; All the coincidence counts were acquired in 5s.
As shown in Fig. 1, the time bases and frequency bases
at Alice and Bob sides are marked as T1, F1, T2, and F2,
respectively. The experiments were carried out with optical
fiber transmission of 20 km under a pump level that the single
photon count rates of SNSPDs of the four corresponding bases
are 554kHz, 321kHz, 315kHz, and 245kHz, respectively. Fig.
3 shows the time resolved coincidence counts between Alice
and Bob under four possible basis combinations, which were
acquired in 5s and used to take the calculation of security test
of DO-QKD. The bin width for the coincidence measurement
is 30ps. It should be noted that only 30% of the single photon
detection events of time bases at Alice and Bob were selected
randomly to calculate the coincidences for the security test
and rest of them were used to generate raw keys.
Fig. 3(a) is the coincidence counts of T1-T2. It can be
seen that the coincidence peak of the single photon detection
events recorded under time bases at both Alice and Bob is a
narrow peak with a FWHM of 150ps. The timing jitters of
SNSPDs mainly contributes to the peak width. Fig. 3(b) and
Fig. 3(c) are the coincidences of T1-F2 and F1-T2, i.e. the sin-
gle photon detection events are recorded under different bases
at Alice and Bob. In these two cases, the coincidence peaks
are broadened to 900ps and 870 ps, respectively, by the dis-
persive components at the frequency bases. Fig. 3(d) is the
coincidences of F1-F2. In this case, the single photon events
were recorded under frequency bases at both sides. It can be
seen that narrow coincidence peak recovers due to the nonlo-
cal dispersion cancellation with a FWHM of 150ps. Accord-
ing to the experimental results shown in Fig. 3, the corre-
sponding TFCM can be calculated. By further decomposing
the TFCM, we obtained an upper bound on the Holevo infor-
mation of χ(A;E) = 0.211 bpc (bit per coincidence), which
indicates the impact of excess channel noise and possible dis-
turbance of Eve introduced by the fiber transmission.
FIG. 4. The performance of the coincidence events for key genera-
tion. (a) A typical time resolved coincidence peak under a time bin
of 160ps. (b) The coincidence rate and the coincidence to accidental
coincidence ratio (CAR) under different time bin widths.
For the key generation, Alice and Bob built their keys from
70% of the single photon detection events acquired in the time
bases at both side. Fig. 4 shows the performances of the co-
incidence events for key generation. Fig. 4(a) shows a typical
coincidence peak between the detection events that Alice and
Bob recorded at time bases. The coincidence was recorded un-
der a time bin of 160ps. The corresponding coincidence rate
and CAR was 35.6KHz and 217, respectively. It can be seen
that the central time bin in the coincidence peak has the max-
imum contribution on the coincidence. Here, we defined the
coincidence count rate record in this time bin as the effective
coincidence count rate, since only the coincidence events in
this bin contribute to the key generation according to the bin
sifting process. It can be expected that the reduction of the
bin width would lead to the decrease of effective coincidence
count rate if the bin width was smaller than the width of the
coincidence peak. The effective CAR was defined as the ratio
between the effective coincidence rate and the average acci-
dental coincidence rate in bins outside the coincidence peak.
Fig. 4(b) shows the effective coincidence count rate and ef-
fective CAR calculated under different time bin width. It can
4be seen that the effective coincidence rate rise obviously un-
der increasing time bin width, which shows that the increase
of bin width would improve the key generation rate. While,
the effective CAR decreases under increasing bin width since
the accidental coincidence count rate in one bin rises more
rapidly. It can be expected that smaller bin width is preferred
to reduce the QBER of the raw key. Hence, tradeoff should be
taken on the bin width selection.
FIG. 5. Raw key generation rate and QBER under different bin width
τ and division numbers I.
To optimize the performance of the DO-QKD system in this
work, we firstly considered a specific three level format, in
which a frame has 16 slots, hence, N = 4. The raw key gen-
eration rate and QBER were calculated according the experi-
mental data under different bin width τ and bin number I in a
slot. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 shows that the raw key generation rate increases with
the increasing bin width, on the other hand, the QBER is also
mainly increases with the increasing bin width under all the
bin number I. These results can be explained by Fig. 4(b).
However, in the case of I = 3, the QBER increases with de-
creasing bin width when the bin width is small. The reason is
that if the slot is too narrow to cover the coincidence peak, the
coincidence located the same bin but adjacent slots at the two
sides would introduce obvious errors. Hence, there is a bin
width for the minimum QBER when I = 3. It can be expected
that in the cases of I= 4 and 5, the minimum QBERs also ex-
ist. However, they would appear at smaller bin widths which
is not shown in Fig. 5, since they have lager slot widths if the
bin width is fixed. To optimize the performance when I = 3,
we could choose appropriate parameters to achieve maximum
raw key generation rate under a specific QBER requirement
according to Fig. 5. For example, if the requirement is set as
QBER ≤ 5%, we could obtain the optimized parameters that
the bin width τ is 160 ps and bin number in a slot I is 3. In this
case, the raw key generation rate is 151 kbps with a QBER of
4.95%.
Then, we calculated the system performance under differ-
ent dimension N and obtained the optimized format param-
eters and corresponding system performance under QBER ≤
5%. The results are shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that the raw
key generation rate reaches its maximum (151 kHz) when the
dimension is N = 4 with a bin width of 160ps. If N is smaller
than 4, the key generation per coincidence is limited. On the
other hand, if the dimension N increases to N = 5, smaller bin
width is required to guarantee QBER ≤ 5%, which highly re-
FIG. 6. Optimized bitrate and the corresponding bin widths under
different dimension N with QBER all bounding below 5%.
duce the effective coincidence count rate. It is worth noting
that in this work the QBER is highly restrained by the three
level bin sifting process.
We optimized parameters of the format according to Fig. 5
and Fig. 6. As a result, a raw key generation rate of 151kbps
with a QBER of 4.95% can be achieved under N = 4, I = 3
and τ=160ps. Then, in this case secret keys were extracted
from raw ones after error reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation. Based on the acquired raw key with low QBER, the
low-density parity-check (LDPC) code19 were adopted for er-
ror reconciliation, which was efficient at data interaction. The
reconciliation efficiency β = 90% was achieved at this low
QBER (4.95%). Privacy amplification was implemented us-
ing hash functions20. The secret key rate could be estimated
by Eq. (1). The analysis of Fig. 3 has shown that Eve’s Holevo
information χ(A;E) is 0.211 bpc, which is estimated by the
calculated TFCM. The Shannon information between Alice
and Bob I(A;B) can be estimated by similar way, which is
3.48 bpc in this experimental system. As a result, the secret
key capacity ∆I is 2.92 bpc according to Eq.(1), leading to a
secret key rate of 104 kbps.
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate the
entanglement-based DO-QKD with high dimensional
encoding over optical fibers of 20 km, in which the energy-
time entangled photon pairs were generated by SFWM in a
piece of silicon waveguide. A DCM is utilized to compensate
the chromatic dispersion introduced by single mode fibers of
20 km. By three level bin sifting towards the single photon
events measured based on the time bases, the QBER is signif-
icantly reduced to about 4.95% under a raw key rate of 151
kbps. The whole system is secured by nonlocal dispersion
cancellation based on dispersive optics. Finally, a secure
key capacity of 2.92 bpc is achieved after subtracting Eve’s
Holevo information. These experimental results show that
entanglement based DO-QKD protocol can be implemented
in an efficient and practicable way. It has great potential on
quantum secure communication networks in the future.
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